Wednesday, December 2, 2009

Will Earnings Eventually Support the Stock Market Rally?

Since closing at 676.53 on March 9th, 2009, the S&P has rallied some 63.7% to its current level of ~1108. Some market pundits attribute this meteoric rise to the Fed's unprecedented market intervention(s), which has created massive amounts of liquidity. Other skeptics call it another round of irrational exuberance; a short-lived bull market within a cyclical (or secular?) bear market. Still others say this rally is for real, that the equity markets typically look 6-9 months into the future, and that only the fools are still on the sidelines.

Granted, stocks have become relatively non-cheap, at least in terms of the multiples of reported earnings which they're trading. The real question behind this debate however, is "Whether corporate earnings will catch up to, and eventually support, the current stock market's trading range". Before I attempt to answer that question, I'd like to first frame the argument in terms of the psychological basis from which each side is attempting to further its argument.

The first point I need to make is that this economy IS recovering. However, the rising tide is not lifting all boats. I wouldn't want to be D.R Horton right now, but I wouldn't mind being Intel. Most of all, I would not want to be a small business; they have effectively been denied access to nearly all sources of credit, they aren't large enough to throw their weight around with suppliers, and oh yea, health insurance premiums are about to go up. Given this set of facts, its easy to see why nearly every small business owner in this country is quite pessimistic at this moment. Furthermore, small businesses don't use - or even understand for that matter - GAAP accounting. Their focus is on cash in v. cash out, i.e small business income statements are usually just two lines: sales and costs. Therefore, profit boosting concepts like LIFO liquidations and unrealized gains on trading securities are somewhat foreign, effectively obfuscating their perception of recent corporate profit increases. Psychologically, they are mad; the government bailed out big business and didn't throw them a crumb. Watching the stock market rise on a daily basis simply angers many small business owners.

On the flip side, big business reacted quickly and viciously to the Great Recession; they laid people off in the thousands and shuttered profitable plants/mills just to achieve higher asset utilization rates. The result was the temporary occurrence of costly restructuring charges. The largest of these are probably behind us though, meaning that bottom lines will be juiced in the coming quarters. The next advantage available to big business is global scale; there may be little US based sales growth in the months ahead, but developing markets continue to grow. Given this set of facts, many large corporations that operate in a handful of industries have reason to be cautiously optimistic.

Don't think for a minute that the current stock market bulls v bears argument isn't completely driven by this psychological and economic dichotomy. Bulls typically cite the earnings cycle, proposing that the following sequence of events will lead to an earnings - and an economic - rebound:
  1. Corporation's cut costs
  2. Productivity Increases
  3. Profits begin to increase
  4. Inventories are replenished
  5. Capital Expenditures are made
  6. Hiring resumes
  7. Consumption rebounds
In contrast, the bears are either in denial that corporate profits will increase, or (the more sophisticated ones) would say that once inventories are replenished, firms will hold onto cash and the capital expenditures will never materialize. From my perspective, the resumption of hiring looks to be the major impediment to a recovery. When hiring does resume, it will be at the largest, healthiest multi-national corporations. Furthermore, those hired first will the most educated and most able to add value to the firm. Housing and construction may never return to pre-recession employment (absolute) numbers, and manufacturing jobs will continue to be lost to a combination of technology and China. This doesn't bode well for the consumer as a whole, whom I expect to behave anemically for another 3-7 years.

That all being said, the answer to the title to of this post is something to the effect of "some of them". It's up to individual investors to figure out which firms have the global scale and management capacity to go out and find (take?) new sources of revenue, whether it be via acquisitions or expansion into new markets. Beware of dead business models.  Sphere: Related Content

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

Components of RNOA: Margin and Turnover

Previously, I touched on the importance of Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA), specifically with respect to my view that it's foolish to examine a firm's ROE without an idea as to the relative contributions of operating and nonoperating returns. I'd like to examine RNOA a bit further, and place some emphasis on it's dual components of margin and turnover. Just to refresh, the original formula for Operating Return is:


RNOA = Net Operating Profit After Taxes / Average Net Operating Assets


In order to illustrate the margin and turnover components, I'll create a new, equivalent equation:


RNOA = (Net Operating Profit Margin / Sales)  X (Sales / Net Operating Asset Turnover)


Therefore:


RNOA = Net Operating Profit Margin (NOPM)  X  Net Operating Asset Turnover (NOAT)


Truthfully, I don't blame you if this still doesn't make a whole lot of sense. So, let's look at this using some real numbers from the largest employer in the world/retail titan..WalMart (WMT).

Above I've included every part of an equation necessary to understand RNOA's components of NOPM and NOAT. Keep in mind that WalMart's RNOA was originally calculated using NOPAT/RNOA, or $15,637/$109,987 to yield 14.22%. To calculate Net Operating Profit Margin (NOPM) I took NOPAT of $15,637 and divided it by 2009 revenue of $401,244. The resulting 3.9% seems rather feeble for such a monster like WalMart; it means that for every dollar of sales revenue, WalMart is only earning 3.9 cents of after tax operating profit. Remember though that the margin is somewhat useless in the absence of turnover figures. To calculate Net Operating Asset Turnover (NOAT), I took 2009 revenue of $401,244 (millions by the way, crazy right) and divided it by Average Net Operating Assets of $109,987. The resulting NOAT is 3.65. Now multiply 3.9 (NOPM) by 3.65 (NOAT); the result should look familiar - 14.2%. Walmart's figures highlight an important concerning the relationship between margins and asset turnover. A high margin firm won't necessarily earn healthy returns for shareholders; it all depends on the turnover they are able to achieve given that level of margin.



I included WalMart's 20.63% ROE just to illustrate that the company is earning a very healthy operating return component of 69% (14.22RNOA / 20.63ROE). Interestingly, the company doesn't highlight this ratio in its financial presentations. Rather, they use a modified return on investment (ROI) formula that takes operating income as its starting point, and adds back in some non-cash adjustments for depreciation and amortization to arrive at the numerator. In the denominator, WalMart creates an average operating assets figure, similar to NOA except that operating liabilities are not netted out of the equation. Although investors should keep an eye on these metrics that are recommended by management, don't forget that they are non-GAAP and are probably suggested for a reason.


*no positions
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Monday, November 30, 2009

Beyond ROE: Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA)

Many investors rely on Return-on-Equity (ROE) to gauge a firm's ability to generate profit from each dollar of equity; a somewhat fundamental determination when assessing the attractiveness of owning a piece of that equity. The problem is, ROE is calculated as net income divided by average stockholders equity, meaning that you have no idea the extent to which leverage played a role in the returns generated for shareholders. In the aftermath of the credit bubble, it should be apparent that not all returns are created equally. For instance, had you been an investor in Merrill Lynch around say, 2006, you may have been lulled into complacency by the firms ridiculous returns-on-equity; oblivious unfortunately to the fact that MER's performance was merely the result of massive amounts of leverage. Fortunately, through calculation of a firm's Return on Net Operating Assets (RNOA), we can isolate the portion of ROE attributable to the operations of the business (the portion that matters).

The general concept behind RNOA is that ROE= Operating Return + Nonoperating Return. As I've said, investors should focus on the operating portion of return, which is calculated as follows:
Operating Return (RNOA) = Net Operating Profit After Taxes (NOPAT) / Average Net Operating Assets (NOA)

The calculation of RNOA requires you be able to differentiate between the operating, and nonoperating items on both the balance sheet and income statement. This should be somewhat easier to do with the income statement, just because although GAAP doesn't require it, most companies will break out their operating results on their financial statements. Management tends to be judged based on the firms operating results, so this shouldn't be surprising. I'll refer to Dell's most recent full year results to illustrate the RNOA calculation.

Step 1: Calculate NOPAT
For FY '09, Dell logged pretax income of $3324M, and income tax expense of $846M, resulting in an effective tax rate of 25.45% (846/3324). Dell posted operating income of $3190M; therefore, applying the 25.45% tax rate, we can state that Dell's NOPAT is $2378M ($3190 X (1-.2545) ). 

Step 2: Calculate average net operating assets (NOA)
First of all, Net Operating Assets =  Operating Assets - Operating Liabilities. The components of each category are listed below.
Operating Assets
Cash/Cash Equivalents
Accounts Receivable
Inventories
Prepaid expenses
Other Current Assets
Property, plant and equipment (net)
Capitalized lease assets
Natural Resources
Equity method investments (unless unrelated to the core business)
Goodwill and other intangible assets
Deferred income tax assets (current and long term portions)

Other long term assets

Operating Liabilities
Accounts Payable
Accrued Liabilities
Deferred income tax liabilities (current and long term portions)

Pension and other post-employment obligations

Dell's 2009 and 2008 NOA are $6488M and $7501M, respectively. The average of these two numbers is $6995M. Therefore:


RNOA = NOPAT / NOA
= $2378 / $6995
=34%


This compares with a 2009 ROE of:
ROE= Net Income / Avg Stockholders Equity
= $2478M / $4003M
=61.9%


A conclusion which can be drawn from these results is that only 55% of Dell's ROE (34/61.9) is attributable to operations. I'd generally like to see a higher ratio of operating to nonoperating return; however, Dell's 34% RNOA is substantially higher than the 10% average RNOA for publicly traded companies. A further examination into Dell reveals that it's debt-to-equity ratio (total liabilities divided by total stockholders equity) is 5.2, meaning that for every dollar of equity, dell has $5.20 worth of debt. This high debt to equity ratio partially explains the juiced ROE number, and should probably be monitored by investors.


*no positions
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Friday, November 27, 2009

Vertical Analysis of Financial Statements: Coca-Cola v Pepsi

Due to the complexity of corporate financial statements, the prospect of deciphering meaningful insight can be a daunting task. Furthermore, the ratios deployed by professional analysts are numerous, effectively creating a thousand piece jigsaw puzzle whose composition perpetually and frequently fluctuates. Luckily, for those of you who lack either the time or mental stamina to perform calculations such as the disaggregation of the components of return on net operating assets (RNOA), a relatively effective process exists known as Vertical Analysis. The premise of Vertical Analysis is to create common-size financial statements, where all balance sheet and income statement items are converted into percentage terms for purposes of comparison.Using vertical analysis, comparisons can be made between firms regardless of size. This approach is especially useful when determining the relative financial health of competing firms within the same industry. Financial metrics display a large degree of variability across industries; however, within a given industry, competitors should be fairly aligned in terms of funding sources (debt v equity), liquidity, asset turnovers etc. Below is a vertical analysis I prepared using the FY '08 balance sheets from Pepsico (PEP) and Coca-Cola (KO).
Vertical Analysis of Financial Statements - Pepsi v Coke

From here, it's fairly easy to scan through Coke and Pepsi's relative balance sheet percentages(page 2 of pdf) , making some fairly useful generalizations. The first thing I noticed from this comparison is that Pepsi and Coca-Cola have a nearly identical composition of current v long term assets (30/70). However, Cash/Cash Equivalents represents 11.7% of Coke's assets, but only 5.7% of Pepsi's. It appears that Pepsi makes up the difference in it's proportion of (net) receivables to assets (13% v 7.6%); this could just be a timing issue, but it could also mean that Pepsi has become more aggressive in terms of the conditions by which it will offer credit to customers. The next observation I'd make has to do with differences between the two company's capital structures. Pepsi's debt/equity split percentage is 66.2/33.8, whereas Coca-Cola's capital structure is comprised of 49.5% debt and 50.5% equity. Interestingly though, Pepsi's short term debt only represents 1% of the right side of the balance sheet, whereas Coca-Cola comes in at 16.1%. This could just be an indication that Coke relies more heavily on commercial paper to fund it's short term operations; it could also mean that Coke has a significant amount of long term debt coming due in the months ahead. Coca-Cola's 2008 10-K should contain footnote disclosures describing the nature of these short term obligations. In this sense, the vertical analysis above serves as an informative starting point from which to diagnose any potential issues the firm might have down the road. Additionally, vertical analysis can expedite the analysis process by narrowing down which footnotes you, as an investor, should be concerned with.

*no positions  Sphere: Related Content

Friday, November 20, 2009

Fed Flushes $1.7B Worth of Taxpayer Funds Down the Toilet

Last week, under the cover of darkness and in an extraordinary show of Government incompetence, the FDIC seized United Commercial Bank. The problem is that Mingsheng, a Chinese bank, had already approached the Fed about a potential acquisition of UCB. Mingsheng, which had already invested $129M into UCB, was presumably trying to salvage some portion of it's investment. Unfortunately, Mingsheng's application was destined to whither away on a bureaucrats desk, as various branches of the federal government bumbled about in an attempt to resolve the problems at UCB - oblivious it seems to the cost effective solution right before their eyes. They (Mingsheng) were not the only investors though; last year the Treasury injected $298M into UCB as part of the now infamous TARP program. Furthermore, the FDIC estimates that the UCB failure will cost it's Deposit Insurance Fund $1.4B. The DCF is theoretically funded through premia leveled on the banking industry; however, we all know that this cost gets passed onto consumers in the form of higher overdraft, ATM, inactivity etc. fees. Therefore, the Treasury/Fed/FDIC - acting in disorganized concert - managed to flush $1.7B worth of taxpayer money down the toilet.

This is truly an embarrassment. Sphere: Related Content

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

Diluted EPS and the Capital Structure

Although the financial media's reporting centers almost entirely on a corporation's reported basic earnings-per-share (EPS), most analysts have historically paid attention to a different line on the income statement: Diluted Earnings per Share. Diluted EPS takes into account the potential dilutive effect that would ensue if holders of the firms preferred stock and bonds were to convert their stake into common equity. This possibility theoretically exists whenever investors purchases securities that include a conversion option. Usually there is some sort of market based trigger point, but ultimately those details will be contained on the face of the preferred stock certificate, or in the bond covenants. For the sake of simplicity, let's say that Company X earned $1000 in a given quarter, and there are 1000 shares outstanding, resulting in quarterly Basic EPS of $1/share. However, let's assume that Company X has also financed itself via 500 shares of convertible preferred stock which give holders the right to convert each preferred share into 2 shares of common equity. Assuming that all preferred holders exercised that option, Company X would record 2000 outstanding shares of common stock, and would only have earned 50 cents/share for the same quarter. This hypothetical example is rather extreme for the purposes of making a point; below is a chart showing Basic v Diluted EPS during the most recently reported quarter for 7 large firms:
Corporations must disclose both basic and diluted EPS on the income statement, however the actual calculation is below for those who must know:

Diluted EPS = (Net Income - Preferred Dividends) / (Weighted Average # of Common Shares Outstanding + Additional Shares Due to Dilutive Securities)

Arithmetically, we can see that the dilutive effect increases the denominator, reducing the amount of net income available to each shareholder. In many firms with simple capital structures, the basic and diluted EPS numbers will be identical. However, firms that utilize more complex financing instruments generally have more potential for dilutive equity conversions.

Going forward, I would expect Diluted EPS to continue to gain significance, especially with regards to analysis of financial corporations. As banks struggle to refinance trillions of dollars worth of debt, the use of convertible options should become more popular for a couple of reasons. First, a conversion option represents value to the investor and additional capital for the borrower. Second, if the conversion option is tied to a regulatory trigger like TCE ratios, then the borrower is essentially selling an automatic equity boosting instrument for times of market distress. If things play out like I anticipate regarding convertible debt, the gap between basic and diluted EPS will grow further. Equity investors need to monitor these developments to insure that they are not diluted into oblivion.

*no positions
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Friday, November 13, 2009

Contingent Convertible Bond Ruminations

The latest idea to revolve around the task of inoculating the global financial system involves a financial instrument known as the contingent convertible bond. Overall, I'm somewhat pleased that the discussions surrounding financial reform have begun to deviate from the bonus-recipient-witch hunt mentality which has dominated the Obama Administration's rhetoric to date. Furthermore, it's encouraging to see the private sector begin to formulate it's own prescriptions; opposed to of course government solutions which amount to nothing more than throwing (other people's) cash at the situation, appointing czars of every shape and form, and hoping the problem solves itself.

Contingent convertibles are a nifty bit of financial innovation (isn't that supposed to be synonymous with evil and destructive?) that takes regular convertible bonds and adds a twist. The process would play out something like this:
  1. Investors give cash to banks, and in return, they receive contingent convertible bonds.
  2. Investors receive regular coupon payments, just like with any other bond.
  3. If and only if the bank's capital ratio falls below a certain threshold determined by the bond contract, the instrument will convert into equity.
Part of the draw for contingent convertibles is that the conversion clause is not based upon observable market prices. In that sense, even the most concerted efforts by short-sellers can not trigger the conversion. Conceptually, assuming these instruments comprised a significant enough portion of global banks' capital structures, they would act as automatic stabilizers during periods of economic distress, bolstering banks' capital ratios without the need for TARP-like government interventions. As an aside, will widespread use of contingent convertibles be evidence of the Europeanization of financial markets? We all know how much the Europeans love their automatic stabilizers.

To briefly play devil's advocate, I could see the establishment of contingent convertibles causing a wholesale shift in the way bank stocks are valued. Capital ratios would be monitored very closely in order to develop a probability of equity conversion; this could cause bank stocks to prematurely fall in anticipation of a massive equity dilution. I could also see bank stocks' losing all of their appeal in terms of a dividend investment. That might not be an issue now, what with 1 cent dividends imposed by the Treasury; however, I have to assume that by say 2015, banks will once again be paying healthy dividends. The problem is from the banks standpoint, the debt to equity conversion will amount to the elimination of a contractual obligation to make semi-annual interest payments, and replace it with the extremely optional payment of a dividend. If I were investing in a bank's contingent convertibles from a current income perspective, I would prefer that the potential conversion be structured so that I received some class of preferential stock whereby a dividend comparable to the coupon rate was guaranteed. Nevertheless, the discussions surrounding contingent convertibles is a net positive in my book; we'll just have to wait and see if this new "movement" has the legs necessary to become a widespread reality.
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